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Abstract: The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) is a centralized
service which matches graduating medical students to hospital residency positions. The NRMP has been successful in producing stable matchings between
individuals and hospitals, meaning that no student and hospital both prefer
each other to their assigned matching. Recently student couples have been able
to submit joint preference lists to obtain positions in close proximity. With the
addition of student couples, stable matchings are not guaranteed. In this paper
acceptability graphs will be used to characterize the existence of stable matchings in the couples problem. These characterizations can be used to generate
instances of the couples matching problem for which it is known whether or not
a stable matching exists.

1

Introduction

Several stable matching problems have been studied; the most well-known is the
stable marriage problem. The marriage problem was introduced in 1962 by Gale
and Shapley (1962); it describes a situation involving a community of m men
and n women. Each person creates a preference list by ranking the members of
the opposite sex according to his or her preferences for a marriage partner. A
matching is then created based on these preferences. A stable matching occurs
when the men and women are paired in a way such that no man and woman
both prefer each other to their actual mates. Gale and Shapley proved that a
stable matching exists for any set of preference lists by devising an algorithm
which always produces a stable matching.
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) is a real-life situation
involving the stable matching problem. The NRMP was developed in 1951
after years of turmoil involving the matching of medical students to residency
positions at hospitals. The NRMP is still used today to fill over 20,000 positions
a year (Roth, 1990).
1 Research supported in part by an NSF REU grant no. DMS-9424098 at Lafayette College,
1997.

1

Bianco, Hartke & Larimer

2

Originally, the NRMP used an algorithm that was equivalent to Gale and
Shapley’s algorithm for the stable marriage problem (Roth, 1984). Using Gale
and Shapley’s work, it can be shown that there exists a stable matching between
hospitals and students for every preference list. In recent years, however, the
NRMP has modified its algorithm to accommodate changes in the residency
labor market. One of these changes has allowed couples to submit joint preference lists so that the members of the couple will be matched to residency
positions in close proximity. With the addition of couples, several results about
stable marriages no longer apply to the NRMP algorithm (Roth, 1984; Ronn,
1990; Aldershof and Carducci, 1996). In particular, Roth has shown that a
stable matching may not exist, and Ronn has shown that determining whether
a stable matching exists is N P -complete.
Formally, the objective of a stable matching problem is to create a stable
set of pairings of participants. In the marriage problem, pairings are created
when members from two disjoint sets, often referred to as men and women, are
matched together. The two sets matched by the NRMP are students and hospital residency positions. Each participant creates a strictly-ordered preference
list of a subset of the opposite set. If a student s does not list a position offered
by hospital h or h does not list s, then s and h are not mutually acceptable and
can never be assigned to each other in a matching. The couples problem differs
in that a couple ci , consisting of students s2i−1 and s2i , submits a joint preference list of ordered pairs of hospitals. For example, couple c1 ’s preference list
might be (h1 , h2 ), (h1 , h3 ), (h4 , h5 ), . . .. Thus, as a couple, c1 is indicating that
their first choice would be for s1 to be matched with h1 and s2 to be matched
with h2 . If one or both of those assignments are not possible, then their joint
second choice is for s1 to be matched with h1 and s2 to be matched with h3 .
We will say ci = (s2i−1 , s2i ) is matched with (hj , hk ) when s2i−1 is assigned to
hj and s2i is assigned to hk . When a couple can become matched to a higher
preference (ha , hb ) than the preference they are assigned to, an instability exists. Couple ci can become matched to a higher preference (ha , hb ), if either
(i) ha is matched to student s2i−1 and hb prefers s2i to its current assignment;
or (ii) ha prefers s2i−1 to its current assignment and hb is matched to s2i ; or
(iii) ha prefers s2i−1 to its current assignment and hb prefers s2i to its current
assignment. Thus couple ci and hospitals ha and hb are all at least as well off
as they were immediately preceding the change.
The roommates problem is another variation of the stable matching problem
where only one set of n individuals rank each other. Gale and Shapley (1962)
first gave an example of the roommates problem where a stable matching does
not exist. To investigate the existence of a stable matching, Abeledo and Isaak
(1991) defined an acceptability graph where a node represents an individual
and an edge signifies that two individuals are mutually acceptable. Using this
definition, they proved that a stable matching is guaranteed for all possible
preference lists in the roommates problem if and only if the acceptability graph
is bipartite. In this paper a similar result for the couples problem will be shown
characterizing the existence of a stable matching for all possible preference lists
based on an acceptability graph.
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3

Preferences and Acceptability Graphs

When couples and hospitals submit their preference lists, the lists are purged of
all preferences containing students and hospitals who are not mutually acceptable. Hospitals are assumed to have the unmatched preference u at the end of
their lists, and couples are assumed to have the unmatched preference (u, u) at
the end of their lists. Couples can also include preferences where one student
uses the unmatched preference u. This preference u can be considered to be a
hospital that will accept any student and that has an unlimited quota. In this
paper, a hospital refers to a particular residency position and so has a quota of
one student.
An acceptability graph can be formed using the purged preference lists,
where each node of the graph represents either a hospital or a couple. An edge
between a hospital node and a couple node signifies that the hospital and at
least one student in the couple are mutually acceptable.

3

Acceptability Graphs with Cycles

Acceptability graphs are useful in analyzing the relationships between couples
and hospitals. The existence of stable matchings is related to characteristics of
acceptability graphs, namely the presence of a cycle in the graph. First, the
implications of a cycle in the graph will be examined.
Initially we will consider an instance of the couples matching problem consisting of n couples and 2n hospitals. We will provide a set of preference lists
for which the associated acceptability graph contains a cycle and show that
these preference lists do not admit a stable matching. Then we will use this
result to construct preference lists that do not admit a stable matching for any
acceptability graph that contains a cycle.
Suppose we are to match n couples and 2n hospitals and the associated
acceptability graph contains the cycle c1 , h2 , c2 , h4 , c3 , h6 , . . ., cn , h2n . We
want to find a set of preference lists for the couples and the hospitals so there is
no stable matching. Each couple is adjacent to two hospitals in the cycle. This
may be because the same member of the couple has ranked h2i−2 and h2i in
which case the couple is a partial couple; or it may be because one member of
the couple ranked h2i−2 and the other ranked h2i in which case the couples is
a full couple. In constructing our preference lists, we will treat full couples and
partial couples differently. Knowing whether couple ci is a full couple or a partial
couple also determines how to construct the preference lists of their associated
hospitals h2i−1 and h2i . Couples’ preference lists often include options where
one student in the couple is assigned a desirable position, but the other student
is left unassigned. It is sometimes convenient to refer to a student being left
unassigned as the student being assigned to position “unmatched.” Hospital
h2i is in the cycle and so must be an actual hospital (may not be unmatched),
but hospital h2i−1 is not in the cycle and may be unmatched. We will describe
h2i−1 ’s preference list as if it exists; if h2i−1 is unmatched, ignore its preference

Bianco, Hartke & Larimer

4

list. Subscript arithmetic is modular when appropriate.
If couple ci is a partial couple, their preference list is:
{(h2i , h2i−1 ), (h2i−2 , h2i−1 )}
and the associated hospitals’ preferences are:
h2i−1 :
h2i :

{s2i }
{s2i+1 , s2i−1 }

If couple ci is a full couple, their preference list is:
{(h2i−2 , h2i )}
and the associated hospitals’ preferences are:
h2i−1 :
h2i :

{}
{s2i+1 , s2i }

where ci consists of students s2i−1 and s2i , s2n+1 ≡ s1 , and h0 ≡ h2n .
Lemma 1 Given a situation of n couples and 2n hospitals (n ≥ 2) that have
preferences as described above, no stable matching exists if the number of full
couples is odd.
Proof. Let |Cp | denote the number of partial couples and |Cf | denote the number of full couples. Since there are only 2 |Cp | + |Cf | distinct hospitals ranked
in the couples’ preference lists, there are only 2 |Cp | + |Cf | acceptable hospitals
for 2n students. The expression 2n − (2 |Cp | + |Cf |), which equals |Cf |,lis the
m
|C |

minimum number of students who will be unmatched. Therefore, at least 2f
couples must be unmatched in a possible matching.
With these preference lists it can be shown that in every possible match, one
of the following instabilities must occur:

1. If any partial couple ci is unmatched, then an instability exists because
couple ci can be assigned to their second preference (h2i−2 , h2i−1 ).
2. If an unmatched full couple ci immediately precedes another unmatched
full couple ci+1 in the cycle, then an instability exists because the first
couple ci can become matched to (h2i−2 , h2i ). This can occur since h2i is
unmatched and h2i−2 prefers s2i−1 most.
3. If an unmatched full couple ci immediately precedes a partial couple ci+1
that is matched to their first preference, again couple ci can become
matched to (h2i−2 , h2i ). This can occur since h2i is unmatched and h2i−2
prefers s2i−1 most.
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4. If a partial couple ci matched to their second preference immediately precedes an unmatched full couple or a partial couple matched to their first
preference, then an instability exists because ci can become matched to
their first preference (h2i , h2i−1 ). This can occur since both h2i−1 and h2i
are unmatched.
To prove that a matching is unstable, assume that instabilities 1, 2, and 3
do not occur. It must then be shown that instability 4 occurs in that matching.
Because
l
m there are no unmatched partial couples (instability 1), then there
|C |

are 2f unmatched full couples. Since |Cf | is odd, the number of unmatched
full couples is greater than the number of matched full couples by one. Thus,
there must be two unmatched full couples that do not have any matched full
couples between them in the cycle. However, since no unmatched full couple
immediately precedes another unmatched full couple (instability 2), there exit
partial couples separating the two unmatched full couples. Label the ` partial
couples c1 , . . . , c` , and label the unmatched full couples c0 and c`+1 . Consider
the k th couple, where k is the largest integer less than or equal to ` such that
ck is not assigned to their first preference. The k th couple exists because c1
has their second preference (instability 3, and c0 is unmatched). If k = `, then
h2` = h2k is unmatched, and ck can become matched to their first preference
(h2k , h2k−1 ). If k < `, then ck+1 has their first preference, and h2k is unmatched.
Thus, ck can be matched with their first preference (h2k , h2k−1 ).
Note that if there is only one full couple in the cycle, then c0 = c`+1 and all
partial couples are included in c1 , . . . , c` .
2
Example 1 Consider a problem with three couples, where there are two partial
couples and one full couple.
The preference lists are:
h1
s2

h2
s3
s1

h3
s4

h4
s5
s3

h5

h6
s1
s6

c1 = (s1 , s2 )(partial) c2 = (s3 , s4 )(partial)
(h2 , h1 )
(h4 , h3 )
(h6 , h1 )
(h2 , h3 )

c3 = (s5 , s6 )(f ull)
(h4 , h6 )

At least one couple must be unmatched in each possible matching. All
matchings with only one couple unmatched, along with their instabilities are:
h1
s2
u
s2
s2
s2

h2
s1
s3
s3
u
s1

h3
u
s4
s4
s4
s4

h4
s5
s5
u
s3
s3

h5
u
u
u
u
u

h6
s6
s6
s1
s1
u

instability
c2 → (h2 , h3 )
c1 → (h6 , h1 )
c2 → (h4 , h3 )
c1 → (h2 , h1 )
c3 → (h4 , h6 )
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Theorem 1 For any acceptability graph that contains a cycle, there are preference lists such that no stable matchings exist.
Proof. Consider a minimal cycle in the acceptability graph. Let the length of
the cycle be 2n where n represents the number of couples.
If n is even, then find a couple in the cycle that is mutually acceptable to a
hospital outside of the cycle. Label that couple c1 and the hospital outside of the
cycle h1 . If no such couple exists, then h1 ≡ u. Label the rest of the couples in
the cycle c2 , . . . , cn . Label the hospitals in the cycle h2 , h4 , . . . , h2n−2 , h2n ≡ h0 ,
where couple ci is adjacent to h2i and h2i−2 .
If n is odd, label the couples in the cycle c1 , . . . , cn . Label the hospitals
in the cycle h2 , h4 , . . . , h2n−2 , h2n ≡ h0 , where couple ci is adjacent to h2i and
h2i−2 .
The preference lists are based on the lists constructed in Lemma 1. To add
extra edges to the acceptability graph, construct the preference lists as follows:
The ith couple has the following preference list:

 {(h2 , h1 ), (h2n , h1 ), (hx , hy )} if i = 1 and n is even
{(h2n , h2 ), (hw , hz )}
if i = 1 and n is odd
ci =

{(h2i−2 , h2i ), (hw , hz )}
if 2 ≤ i ≤ n

where ci consists of students s2i−1 and s2i . Hospitals hx and hy both denote
any hospital. There can be as many extra preferences added to the bottom of a
couple’s preference list as necessary to create the acceptability graph. Hospitals
hw and hz both denote any hospital, where w 6= 2i − 2.
All other couples not in the cycle can have any preference list that creates
the given acceptability graph.
The j th hospital has the following preference list:

{s2 , sx }
if j = 1



{s3 , s1 , sx }
if j = 2 and n is even
hj =
{s3 , s2 , sx }
if j = 2 and n is odd



{sj+1 , sj , sx } if 2 < j ≤ 2n

where s2n+1 ≡ s1 and sx denotes any other student not already mentioned in
that preference list. There can be as many students as necessary.
All hospitals not in the cycle can have any preference list that creates the
given acceptability graph.
It remains to be shown that additions made to the preference lists in Lemma
1 to construct these preference lists do not create a stable matching.
Consider couple ci who is matched to one of the added preferences.
If i = 1 and n is even, then an instability occurs because the couple can
become matched to their second preference (h2n , h1 ). This can happen since
h2n ranks s1 first and h1 ranks s2 first.
If 1 < i ≤ n and n is even, the instabilities as described in the proof of
Lemma 1 will occur, since no full couple has a preference of the form (hw , hz )
where w = 2i − 2.
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If n is odd, then there must be a full couple who is not matched to their
first preference immediately preceding another full couple who is not matched to
their first preference. This situation creates instability 2 from Lemma 1, and the
first of the these two couples can become matched to their first preference, since
the second full couple has no preference of the form (hw , hz ) where w = 2i − 2.
2
We can add individuals to this type of problem by viewing an individual as
partnered with a dummy student who only ranks unmatched on its preference
list. Thus an individuals student’s preference list is of the form (h1 , u), (h2 , u),
. . .. This “couple” can be involved in a cycle as a partial couple only, but it
behaves like any other partial couple with u as an associated hospital.

4

Tree Acceptability Graphs

Having shown that any acceptability graph that contains a cycle is not guaranteed to have a stable matching, the next logical question is whether or not
stable matchings always exist on tree graphs. To explore this question, an algorithm similar to the current NRMP algorithm (Roth 1998) will be constructed
to find a stable matching for any set of preference lists. The general method
of the algorithm is to add couples one at a time, making the matching stable
before a new couple is added. The algorithm changes the matching only when
an instability exists. To describe these changes, the following definitions are
needed:
In the couple proposing phase, a couple cm begins at the top of their preference list and proposes to hospitals until both hospitals in a preference accept
the students’ offers. A hospital accepts an offer only if that hospital prefers
the proposing student to its current assignment. If no such preference exists,
then the couple becomes unmatched. If such a preference (ha , hb ) does exist,
then two possibilities could occur. In most cases, cm becomes matched to their
preference and the hospitals ha and hb become matched to the proposing students. In these cases if a student in couple ch (without loss of generality, assume
student s2h−1 ) was previously matched to either ha or hb , then both students
in ch are bumped from their assignments, and ch is added to the queue Cb of
bumped couples. The hospital that student s2h was matched to also becomes
bumped and is added to the queue Hb of bumped hospitals. It is possible that
two couples are bumped from their matches when cm becomes matched. While
in the queues, bumped couples and bumped hospitals are currently unmatched.
If a hospital is currently in the bumped queue Hb and accepts an offer from a
student, then the hospital is removed from Hb .
The other possibility is that one of ha or hb is a bumped hospital and was
last matched to a student in cm . Without loss of generality, assume that ha is
that hospital. Hospital ha would prefer being matched to being unmatched, but
must check to see if a more preferred student than the proposing student s2m−1
in cm is available. This requires ha to enter hospital proposing phase, with the
restriction that ha cannot propose to s2m , the student in cm not proposing to ha .
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If ha proposes to s2m−1 , then cm accepts, becoming matched to the preference
(ha , hb ). If ha proposes to any other bumped couple, that couple rejects the
offer. If ha is accepted at a more preferred match, then cm remains in Cb as a
bumped couple. A situation in which a hospital enters hospital proposing phase
in this way is seen in iteration 5 of Example 2.
In the hospital proposing phase, a hospital ha begins at the top of its preference list and proposes to individual students. A student (without loss of generality, assume s2i−1 ) in couple ci will consider the offer if there exists a preference
(ha , hb ) higher on the couple’s preference list than the ci ’s current assignment.
Couple ci creates a new preference list by purging all preferences from their list
except those of the form (ha , hb ) which are higher than ci ’s current assignment.
Student s2i proposes down the new preference list until his offer is accepted. If
a hospital hb accepts s2i ’s offer, then s2i−1 becomes matched to the proposing
hospital ha , and s2i becomes matched to hb . If hb had been matched to some
student in ch at a preference (hb , hc ), then ch and hc are bumped and added to
their respective queues. If s2i or s2i−1 become matched to different hospitals
than they were previously matched to when accepting the preference (ha , hb ),
then the hospitals they were previously matched to are bumped and are added
to Hb . If no hb accepts, then ci remains at their current match, rejecting ha ’s
offer and ha continues asking down its list. If no student accepts ha ’s offer, then
ha becomes unmatched and is removed from Hb .
Algorithm:
step 1. Create a matching M that contains all of the hospitals and no couples.
Set the queues Cb and Hb to empty.
step 2. Add a new couple cn to M . Enter couple proposing phase with cn to
resolve any instabilities that exist with cn .
step 3. If the queue Cb is not empty, then remove a couple ci from Cb using
last-in-first-out (LIFO) ordering. Enter couple proposing phase with ci to
resolve any instabilities created by the bumping of the couple. Go to step
3.
step 4. If the queue Hb is not empty, then remove a hospital hj from Hb using
LIFO ordering. Enter hospital proposing phase with hj to resolve any
instabilities created by the bumping of the hospital. Go to step 3.
step 5. If not all couples have been added to M , then go to step 2.
An iteration begins at step 2 and ends when step 5 is reached.
Example 2 Consider the following preference lists and the operation of the
algorithm upon the preference lists.
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The hospitals’ preference lists are:
h1
s2

h2
s3
s1
s4

h3
s3
s7
s4
s5

h4
s5

h5
s6

h6
s8

h7
s7

h8
s8
s9
s7

h9
s10

The couples’ preference lists are:
c1 = (s1 , s2 )
(h2 , h1 )

c2 = (s3 , s4 )
(h2 , h3 )
(h3 , h2 )
(h3 , u)

c3 = (s5 , s6 )
(h3 , h5 )
(h4 , h5 )

c4 = (s7 , s8 )
(h8 , h6 )
(h3 , h8 )
(h7 , h6 )

c5 = (s9 , s10 )
(h8 , h9 )

The operation of the algorithm follows. Insignificant steps have been omitted.
iteration
1
2

3
4
5

step
1
2
2
3
4
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
5

outcome
matching has no couples
c1 → (h2 , h1 )
c2 → (h2 , h3 )
c1 → (u, u)
h1 → u
c3 → (h4 , h5 )
c4 → (h8 , h6 )
c5 → (h8 , h9 )
c4 → (h3 , h8 )
c1 → (h2 , h1 ) †
c2 → (h3 , u)
c4 → (h8 , h6 )
c5 → (h8 , h9 )
c4 → (h7 , h6 )
algorithm terminates

Cb
{}
{}
{c1 }
{}
{}
{}
{}
{c4 }
{c5 , c2 }
{c5 , c2 }
{c5 , c4 }
{c5 }
{c4 }
{}

Hb
{}
{}
{h1 }
{h1 }
{}
{}
{}
{h6 }
{h6 , h9 , h2 }
{h6 , h9 }
{h6 , h9 , h8 }
{h9 }
{h6 }
{}

† This occurs since h2 enters hospital proposing phase when c2 asks their preference (h3 , h2 ). Student s1 then accepts h2 ’s offer, and c2 remains in Cb . The
resulting stable matching is:
c1
(h2 , h1 )

c2
(h3 , u)

c3
(h4 , h5 )

c4
(h7 , h6 )

c5
(h8 , h9 )

In order to show that this algorithm will always produce a stable matching
when operating on tree acceptability graphs, two aspects must be considered:
stability and finiteness. To examine these aspects, the following definition and
lemma are needed: A changed item is a hospital or couple that at some point
in the iteration is assigned a different mate than the one they were assigned to
at the beginning of the iteration.
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Lemma 2 If the matching is stable at the beginning of the current iteration,
then there exists a path of changed items on the graph from any changed couple
or hospital back to the new couple cn .
Proof. Assume that there is a changed couple or hospital x on the graph that
has no path in the induced subgraph of changed items back to the new couple
cn . Determine the first changed item y in the component of the subgraph that
contains x. Since y was changed it must have been involved in an instability.
When y became changed, it was not adjacent to any changed item. Therefore,
the instability must have been present in the original matching. This contradicts
the assumption that the matching at the beginning of the iteration was stable.
2
Lemma 3 Upon running the algorithm on a tree acceptability graph, the matching at the end of each iteration of the algorithm is stable.
Proof. Let the nth iteration be the first iteration whose outcome is unstable.
Assume the instability involves couple cm who can move to a higher preference
(ha , hb ) than their current assignment. Define a state U of the matching where
cm is not in Cb and is matched to a preference lower than (ha , hb ), and where
ha and hb are not in Hb , ha is matched to s2m−1 or a lower preference, and
hb is matched to s2m or lower. By assumption, the nth iteration begins out of
state U and ends in state U . Consider the last time the matching transitions
into state U and the last changed item x (couple cm , or hospital ha or hb ) that
moves the matching into state U . If x = cm , then cm must have been bumped
from a higher preference, entered couple proposing phase, and became matched
to a lower preference. If this was the case, cm must have proposed to (ha , hb ),
but because ha and hb already fulfill the requirements of state U , they would
have accepted the offer. State U is not reached; therefore, x 6= cm .
If x is a hospital, assume without loss of generality that x = ha , then ha
must have been bumped from a higher preference involving a student in some
couple ch . If ha enters hospital proposing phase, then ha must have proposed to
s2m−1 and cm will accept since hb will accept s2m . State U is not reached since
cm becomes matched to (ha , hb ). Hospital ha cannot enter hospital proposing
phase. To prevent ha from proposing, a student s2i−1 in ci , who is less preferred
by ha than s2m−1 , must propose to ha and be accepted. If ci = ch , then ha
still enters hospital proposing phase and becomes matched to cm . If ci 6= ch ,
then, by Lemma 2, there exists a path Pi of changed items from ci to cn , as well
as a path of changed items from ch to cn . Since ci 6= ch , Pi does not contain
ha , and the trail of changed items in the acceptability graph from ch to cn to
ci to ha to ch always contains a cycle. This contradicts the assumption that
the acceptability graph is a tree. The transition to state U can never occur;
therefore, the outcome of every iteration is stable.
2
Lemma 4 Upon running the algorithm on a tree acceptability graph, the algorithm terminates in a finite number of steps if each hospital is mutually acceptable with at most one student in a couple.
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Proof. Let cm be a couple who becomes matched to (ha , hb ). We will show
that cm ’s assignment will not change in the remainder of the current iteration.
Assume without loss of generality that student s2h in a couple ch is bumped
from ha . If ha has accepted s2m−1 , then s2m−1 is more preferred by ha than s2h
and ha will not accept an offer from s2h while it is matched to s2m−1 . From this
observation and the hypothesis that s2h−1 and ha are not mutually acceptable,
no student in ch can bump s2m−1 from ha .
It remains to be shown that no student in any other couple can bump s2m−1
from being matched with ha . For cm to be bumped from ha by a student in
another couple ci (without loss of generality, assume student s2i−1 ), s2i−1 must
propose and be accepted by ha . Since ci is proposing, they must have been
bumped within this iteration. By Lemma 2, there exists a path Pi of changed
items from ci to cn . Since ha has accepted an offer from cm in this iteration,
there exists a path Pa of changed items from ha through cm to cn as well.
Because ha is in ci ’s preference list, a trail T of changed items is formed in the
acceptability graph from ci to cn to ha to ci . It contains a cycle except in the
case where Pa ∪{edge (ha , ci )} = Pi . This implies, however, that ci was bumped
from ha by cm , which cannot happen since ci 6= ch . Therefore, trail T always
contains a cycle, contradicting the assumption that the acceptability graph is a
tree. Hence, ci can never propose to ha , and no student can bump s2m−1 from
being matched with ha in this iteration.
The same argument can be used to show that s2m−1 cannot be bumped from
hb . It follows, then, that cm can never be bumped from their preference (ha , hb )
and therefore will never be matched to a lower preference. Since the preference
lists are finite, each iteration must end in a finite number of steps. Because
there are a finite number of couples, there are a finite number of iterations, and
thus the entire algorithm will terminate in a finite number of steps.
2
Note that although the problem instance in example 2 does not satisfy the
conditions of Lemma 4, the algorithm terminates in a finite number of steps.
Theorem 2 If the acceptability graph is a tree , then a stable matching exists
for any set of preference lists in which each hospital is mutually acceptable with
at most one student in a couple.
Proof. The algorithm is used to generate a matching. Lemma 4 ensures that
the algorithm will terminate in a finite number of steps, and Lemma 3 ensures
that the matching will be stable.
2
The restriction that each hospital be mutually acceptable with at most one
student in a couple is automatically satisfied if the students in a couple have
different specialties. This algorithm can be modified to accommodate hospitals
with q identical positions by allowing the hospital to continue to accept students’
proposals until all q positions are filled. In the hospital proposing phase, the
hospital only attempts to fill one position for each time it was bumped.
Conjecture 1 In the couples problem, if the acceptability graph is a tree, then
a stable matching exists for any set of preference lists.
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Lemma 3 applies to all tree acceptability graphs, so the only issue is finiteness. There are examples of couples problems in which a single couple ci is
assigned to the same pair of hospitals more than once within an iteration. The
authors have not been able to find an upper bound for the number of times
ci can be assigned to the same pair of hospitals, leading to the possibility of
an infinite loop in the algorithm presented here. These problems occur when
both students in ci are mutually acceptable to a hospital ha . If ci is bumped
by another couple cj that is in turned bumped by a couple different from ci ,
then ci can become matched to a preference they were matched to previously.
Couple ci can revisit the same assignment several times in the same iteration.

5

Conclusion

Acceptability graphs can be used to characterize the existence of stable matchings in the couples problem. If an acceptability graph contains a cycle, then
preference lists can be formed such that no stable matching exists. When the
acceptability graph is a tree, we conjecture that a stable matching always exists
for any set of preference lists. This is the case for problems in which each hospital is mutually acceptable with at most one student in a couple. (See Theorem
2.) These results can be used to develop instances of the couples problem known
to have (or not to have) a stable matching. Such instances can be used to test
heuristics for solving the couples problem.

6
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